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ABSTRACT
This study identifies and describes a general policy pattern common to French and American interveners 
in Vietnam as well as Soviet and American interveners in Afghanistan. Each employed political tactics 
at first and, after their failure, military tactics that also failed. Each intervener then sought a diplomatic 
solution to its dilemma, a goal that it achieved, but the diplomatic outcome masked the larger failure of 
each of the interventions.
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Vietnam and Afghanistan have each had the misfortune of being invaded twice 
by great powers in the seventy years since World War II. The invaders, France, 
the Soviet Union, and America, have each had the misfortune of failing with their 
interventions, and the Americans failed in both Vietnam and Afghanistan. Thus, 
we have four cases of great power intervention and subsequent defeat in two small 
underdeveloped Asian countries: France in Vietnam, America in Vietnam, the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan. 
These four cases share a number of additional similarities in addition to the great 
power intervention and defeat. Each follows a roughly similar pattern. The intervener 
first used political strategies, broadly defined, and only resorted to classic military 
intervention after the political strategies failed. Military tactics also failed and were 
followed by diplomatic efforts that would allow the intervener to leave with some 
degree of dignity. While diplomacy enabled the intervener to leave, it generally did 
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not end their involvement as each continued to support its client for several years. 
It is not just the broad pattern of intervention that is common across these cases. 
Within the military and diplomatic phases, interveners were confronted with similar 
issues, devised similar answers, and experienced similar outcomes. 
The common pattern of these interventions is surprising given the differenc-
es between the cases. Vietnam and Afghanistan have little in common, save for 
a history of resistance to foreign rule. There were three different interveners in two 
different countries and the motives for intervention differed. The Americans sought 
to strengthen and defend their Vietnamese client much as the Soviets wanted to 
strengthen and defend their Afghan client. The French hoped to restore national pres-
tige after defeats in World War II by regaining control of their colonies in Indochina. 
The Americans intervened in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks. These interventions 
also occurred in different eras. The two interventions in Vietnam occurred in the 
early days of the Cold War, while the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan occurred 
late in the Cold War, and the American effort in Afghanistan began only after the 
Cold War had ended. 
The primary purpose of this article is to document the similarities of the French, 
Soviet, and American experiences. Some tentative explanations will be given as to 
why that pattern exists in the four cases, but that is more appropriately a question for 
further research The article is divided into four parts. The first three are devoted to the 
political, military and diplomatic phases of the great power experience in these coun-
tries. Each will begin with a brief summary of the period followed by details from 
each of the four cases. The conclusion will suggest questions for further research.
PERIOD I: PRELIMINARY POLITICAL EFFORTS
SUMMARY
The first phase of these interventions was a political one in which the interveners 
used some of the traditional instruments of international politics to realize their goals. 
These political efforts were of two kinds. In two of the cases, France and Vietnam 
and the U.S. and Afghanistan, they took the form of negotiations as a means of trying 
to reach the interveners’ goals. In the other two cases, U.S. in Vietnam and Soviets 
in Afghanistan, there were extensive efforts aimed at strengthening a client against 
domestic foes. The political phase was often a brief one. French political efforts in 
Vietnam lasted from the end of World War II until late 1946, while American ne-
gotiations with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan lasted from roughly August 1998 
until the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Soviet efforts to strengthen their Afghan client 
lasted only from the April 1978 ‘revolution’ there until December 1979. Only the 
American effort to strengthen its South Vietnamese client was lengthy, lasting from 
the mid-1950s until the dispatch of the first combat troops in 1965.
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All of these efforts failed. Perhaps one reason why is the interveners were too 
impatient, but the fundamental problem was the likely impossibility of realizing their 
goals. In the cases of negotiations, the incompatibility of French and Vietnamese 
goals and American and Afghan goals suggests that there would not be a negoti-
ated solution prior to military efforts. For the French, restoring their Vietnamese 
colony and regaining their great power status was central to their national identity 
after defeats in World War II, but it was incompatible with Vietnamese aspirations 
for independence. The Americans wanted justice for Osama bin Laden following 
al-Qaeda attacks on its embassies in east Africa, for its attack on the U.S.S. Cole, 
and, especially, after 9/11, but the Taliban, reflecting traditional Afghan notions of 
hospitality and knowing the benefits that al-Qaeda’s presence in the country pro-
vided, were unlikely to turn him over. Similarly, unrealizable goals may be the best 
explanation for the failure of the American and Soviet interveners to strengthen 
their clients in Vietnam and Afghanistan respectively. The Americans effectively 
wanted to create a new South Vietnamese state and nation where none had existed, 
while the Soviets were supporting a modernizing leftist government in a traditional 
and conservative Afghan society. The incompatibility of interveners’ goals reflects 
another problem: their failure to learn about much less comprehend the societies 
where they were intervening.
EARLY NEgOTIATIONS: FRANCE AND VIETNAM
The French had effectively been evicted from a governing role in their Indo-
chinese colonies by the Japanese in the early days of World War II. At the end of 
the war, ho Chi Minh declared Vietnamese independence, a reality the French were 
determined to reverse. While those competing aspirations might suggest that war 
was inevitable, neither the French nor the Viet Minh wanted or were prepared to fight 
a war in the fall of 1945. The French had too few troops in the country to launch 
a serious military effort. The Viet Minh also had too few troops and needed time to 
increase their political support in the southern portion of the country. given these 
considerations, the two sides reasoned it was better to negotiate, and they concluded 
a deal in March 1946. The Vietnamese would allow 25,000 French troops to return 
to the north of the country to replace the hated Chinese, sent at the end of World War 
II to disarm the Japanese, and the French would accept the ‘Republic of Vietnam’ 
into the French Union, although there were continuing disagreements about that 
territory’s relationship with Paris. 
Both sides understood that this was a preliminary arrangement and that further 
negotiations were necessary. ho left for France in early June 1946 for further talks, 
but events soon undermined the prospects for success. In Vietnam, the French high 
commissioner in Saigon was doing much to undermine the March agreements, while 
in France, itself, an election had brought a more conservative government to power. 
At the Fontainebleau negotiations in the summer of 1946, neither side would make 
DAVID JERVIS54
concessions on the most important issue, the political future of Vietnam. The Viet 
Minh insisted on independence and a loose relationship with France, the French on 
a system of guided self-rule in which they would control the major ministries. No 
agreement was reached and by the fall of 1946, all expected war. The war began in 
late 1946, first with French shelling of haiphong in November and then with Viet 
Minh attacks in hanoi in December [Logevall 2012: 123–66; Karnow 1997: 165–75].
EARLY NEgOTIATIONS: US AND AFghANISTAN
America’s negotiations talks with the Taliban regime centered around its demand 
that Osama bin Laden be turned over to the United States for trial. Talks had begun 
after the August 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania. For the United States, bin Laden’s presence in Afghanistan was ‘by far the 
most important’ issue on the U.S.-Afghanistan agenda, but it was not optimistic: an 
internal State Department cable noted that the ‘fact is that the leader of the Taliban 
appears to be strongly committed to bin Laden. It is questionable whether U.S (…) 
can influence Omar’s decisions’. Still, there were more than twenty meetings between 
1998–2001 with participation by many high level State Department officials [U.S. 
Taliban Bargained 2005].
The course of the negotiations would seem to verify American skepticism. The 
Americans consistently demanded that bin Laden be turned over to the United States, 
while the Taliban proposed many alternatives, e.g., that he be tried in Afghanistan 
or another Muslim country. There was, according to Karl Inderfurth, one of the 
negotiators in the Clinton years, ‘a continuing effort to evade, deny and obfuscate, 
(…) Their only intention was not to hand bin Laden over’ [quoted in Ottaway and 
Stephens 2001]. The American threat in 1999 that Afghanistan would be bombed if 
there was another al-Qaeda attack did not alter the Taliban’s position. Later, during 
first months of the Bush administration, an Afghan envoy came to Washington to 
meet with reporters and mid-level State Department officials. While American offi-
cials dismissed the visit as just another stalling effort, they did continue to meet with 
Afghan negotiators. The Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Christine Rocca, 
met with the Taliban’s ambassador to Pakistan as late as August 2001 [Ottaway and 
Stephens 2001; U.S. Taliban Bargained 2005]. 
The Taliban were perhaps more interested in negotiations after 9/11 and the 
prospect of U.S. military operations against their country. Their second-in-com-
mand asserted that ‘We would be ready to hand [bin Laden] over to a third country’, 
but also continued what U.S. officials had long characterized as stalling tactics, 
arguing that bin Laden would be turned over ‘(…) provided the U.S. gives us 
evidence and the Taliban are assured that the country is neutral and will not be 
influenced by the United States’. By this late date, President Bush had no interest, 
telling reporters ‘When I said no negotiations, I meant no negotiations’ [quoted in 
Bumiller 2001].
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EFFORTS AT REFORM: US AND VIETNAM
Following the 1954 geneva Accords that effectively ended the French presence 
in Vietnam and divided Vietnam, the United States worked extensively to build 
a South Vietnamese nation and state. Americans provided both money and advice. 
All told, the U.S. provided $4 billion toward this effort in the decade after geneva 
[Carter 2008: 147]. For the first three years, the primary American aid programs were 
of a short-term, humanitarian character, because the country had experienced many 
years of war and several hundred thousand refugees had arrived from North Vietnam. 
Beginning in 1958, however, there was much greater emphasis on more long-term 
projects. These included extensive police and public administration training pro-
grams, rural electrification, road construction, and efforts to diversify the economy. 
These programs reflected the mixed purposes of American assistance, i.e., to help 
develop South Vietnam but also to stave off the collapse of its South Vietnamese 
client, Ngo Dinh Diem. For instance, there was certainly a need for a police force in 
the new country, but a strong police force could also help control political opposition. 
Similarly, the building of major roads facilitated not only the movement of commerce 
but also the movement of troops to and from the capital. By 1960, the security of the 
Diem government had become the most important consideration for both Diem and 
the United States. This despite the fact that per capita income was probably smaller 
in 1961 than it been in 1954. As a result, the twin aims at the outset of the American 
aid project in South Vietnam in 1954, economic development and state building, 
now fell into abeyance, despite the fact that neither had been accomplished [Carter 
2008: 84–95, 117–42]. 
EFFORTS AT REFORM: SOVIET UNION AND AFghANISTAN
The Soviet experience in Afghanistan in the years prior to their December 1979 
invasion is similar to that of the Americans in Vietnam. They became more involved 
after a dramatic political change in the country, the April 1978 ‘revolution’ that 
brought the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to power. While the 
Soviets had long provided aid to Afghanistan, a country on their southern border, the 
amount now increased dramatically. Numerous agreements were signed in 1979 that 
expanded economic and technical cooperation, infrastructure development, and edu-
cational exchanges. All told, the Soviets promised nearly $300 million to the Afghans, 
although the aid took the form of loans, repayable at 3% interest. Emphasis was placed 
on infrastructure, state-owned industries and extracting natural resources [Robinson 
and Dixon 2013: 95–96]. Whatever the positive economic or technical impact of 
these agreements, the policies of the Afghan government alienated large numbers of 
Afghans, much like the impact of Diem’s policies in South Vietnam, and the new 
Soviet client was soon facing serious domestic unrest, a situation that eventually led 
the Soviets to conclude that they had to intervene militarily to protect their client.
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PERIOD II: MILITARY ACTION
SUMMARY
The failure of political efforts did not necessitate that these interveners continue 
their involvement. They did so despite, or perhaps because of, the failure of political 
efforts. Why? As indicated above, each was pursuing what it considered to be impor-
tant national goals – restoration of great power status, justice for the victims of 9/11, 
support for a client defined as important – that it could not abandon easily. Domestic 
politics also played a role in three of these cases, excepting the Soviet decision to 
invade Afghanistan. There was a widespread consensus among the French public in 
1945 that the country should assert a leading role in foreign affairs and that colonies 
were a part of that. American anger and desire for revenge after 9/11 probably made 
military action against Afghanistan inevitable. With respect to Vietnam, American 
presidents believed they had to prevent South Vietnam from falling to communism, 
because of the domestic political consequences of the ‘who lost Vietnam’ debate.
These cases share a number of similarities in this period. Each of the interveners 
expected a quick military victory, perhaps another reason each chose to pursue mili-
tary action after their failed political efforts. Their failure to achieve a quick victory 
and the inability or unwillingness to recognize that any sort of military victory was 
possible meant that this phase was the longest one. Another characteristic, likely 
the product of less-than-successful military efforts, was a constant scrambling to 
find a military strategy that worked. This was reflected in changing commanders, 
debates about troop levels, and changing strategies. Finally, each intervener came 
to place reliance on what Americans in Vietnam referred to as ‘counterinsurgency’, 
i.e., the use of political tactics to supplement military ones in an effort to defeat the 
enemy. That is, the political efforts of phase one did not end, they just disappeared 
in the early portions of the military phase. When they did reappear – in a different 
form – they were typically subordinated to the military effort. Common counterin-
surgency tactics included efforts to put a local face on what was essentially a great 
power intervention and the creation of a local army, both of which aimed to reduce 
costs and generate local support and support for the great power’s efforts at home. In 
each case, the intervener was disappointed with the outcome of all of these efforts. 
A final similarity, of course, is that these military strategies failed. What can 
explain that? Vietnam and Afghanistan constituted uniquely difficult situations for 
the interveners. Populations in both countries had long experience defeating foreign 
invaders, the terrain of both countries was poorly-suited for the kind of war the in-
terveners wanted to fight, and there was a sanctuary for resistance forces in adjacent 
territory, one that the intervener could not or would not attack in a meaningful way. 
The decision by the French, Soviets, and Americans to resort to military action only 
came belatedly, after the political strategies had failed, hindering chances for military 
success. There was eventually recognition in each case that political efforts would 
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have to supplement the military ones if they were to be successful, but military 
considerations usually trumped the political aspects of counterinsurgency. Finally, 
the local governments and armies created as part of those counterinsurgency efforts 
were so weak that the intervener could not take advantage of any hearts and minds 
successes. 
FRANCE IN VIETNAM
The French were confident of military victory in Vietnam, surprising, perhaps, 
given their defeats in Europe and Asia just several years earlier. This confidence was 
probably a consequence of lingering colonial or racist attitudes. At the outset, they 
believed the war would be a ‘cakewalk’ [Morgan 2010: 101]. While the first several 
years of the war were difficult for the French, they retained their optimism. In 1951, 
general Jean de Lattre de Tassigny promised victory in ‘months, perhaps one or two 
years’ [quoted in Morgan 2010: 144]. That confidence was belied by regular changes 
in French commanders and strategies. generals included Marcel Carpentier, Jean de 
Lattre de Tassigny, Raoul Salan, and henri Navarre. At times, they sought victory 
using large-scale units, at others, the aim was to use mobile quick reaction forces. 
Also, typical of military commanders in all of these cases, French commanders 
always wanted more troops. The French chief of staff estimated at the outset of the 
war that 500,000 troops would be needed. This was a figure that Paris would never 
agree to; French conscripts could not be used in Vietnam and there were not enough 
French volunteers or troops from elsewhere in the French Union. To illustrate the 
problem, by the early 1950s the French had only three combat divisions for offen-
sive action – many French soldiers were protecting fixed points – while the Viet 
Minh had six such divisions. Of course, the problem for the French and these other 
interveners was not simply an inadequate number of troops; there was also a polit-
ical dimension to each of these conflicts. The French had controlled Vietnam with 
only several thousand troops prior to World War II but now, fighting a politicized 
and mobilized Vietnamese population, several hundred thousand were insufficient 
[Logevall 2012: 175, 178].
As their traditional military efforts were coming up short, the French supplemented 
these with political efforts to garner more support from the Vietnamese and reduce 
criticism at home. This approach was based on the recognition that military strategies, 
alone, could not win the war. As French general Philippe Leclerc famously remarked, 
‘One does not kill ideas with bullets’ [Logevall 2012: 332–33; Leclerc quoted at p. 119]. 
One political initiative was to make modest concessions on the issue of independence, 
something the French reasoned might undermine support for their Viet Minh foes, earn 
the support of anti-communist nationalists and, equally important, earn the support 
of the United States. Their solution, the ‘Bao Dai solution’ – named for the former 
emperor who would become the new head of state – was to grant ‘independence’ to 
Vietnam and allow it to join the French Union as an Associated State. however, the 
DAVID JERVIS58
country’s independence was greatly circumscribed; the French retained control of 
the area’s foreign and defense policies, and its finances, and, while the new ‘State of 
Vietnam’ would have its own army, it would be equipped and effectively directed by 
the French [Logevall 2012: 204–10]. For these reasons, the grant of independence was 
essentially meaningless. Even Bao Dai recognized this, later remarking that ‘What 
they call a Bao Dai solution turns out to be just a French solution’ [quoted in Karnow 
1997: 190]. Another French policy aimed both at garnering political support for the 
Bao Dai regime and easing their manpower shortages was to create an army for the 
State of Vietnam, a policy initiated in February 1950. The French hoped, according 
to U.S. observers, that ‘Much of the stigma of colonialism can be removed if, where 
necessary, yellow men will be killed by yellow men rather than by white men alone’ 
[quoted in Logevall 2012: 258]. Yet this army was confronted with many problems 
from the start and achieved neither France’s military nor political objectives. One 
important problem was the army’s composition: its commander, Nguyen Van Xuan, 
was a French citizen, a French army officer, and married to a French woman. Most 
of the officers were French: even as late as 1954, when the army had almost 200,000 
Vietnamese soldiers, there were only three Vietnamese generals, seven colonels, and 
eleven lieutenant colonels [Karnow 1997: 202; Miller 2013: 90]. 
UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM
America’s initial optimism about success in Vietnam is illustrated by the fact 
that the first deployment of combat troops in March 1963 numbered only 3,500. 
The failure of its military efforts is illustrated by the increasing number of troops 
over the next five years, to over 500,000 in early 1968 at which time the military 
requested 200,000 more. 
The American commander for much of this period was William Westmoreland. 
his strategy was to protect fixed points, prevent North Vietnamese incursions, and 
then launch ‘search and destroy’ missions in which America’s superior mobility and 
firepower would destroy the enemy. his successor after 1968, Creighton Abrams, 
had a different approach; he advocated ‘clear and hold’, i.e., evicting the enemy from 
certain locales and then protecting the population that remained. Part of Abrams’s 
strategy to hold territory was to provide for the needs of the people, an element of 
counterinsurgency strategy that had been used in Vietnam in the early 1960s. That is, 
in this case, counterinsurgency both preceded and followed more traditional military 
action rather than just following it as was true in the other cases. The ground mission 
was supplemented by massive bombing of North Vietnam as well as Cambodia and 
Laos, but this, too, changed over time as there were bombing halts and expansions 
to try to signal the North Vietnamese about America’s intentions [Bowman 2008; 
Karnow 1997: 451].
The continuing calls for more troops indicate that the military did not believe the 
U.S. had enough troops on the ground. After the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Tet 
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Offensive in early 1968, the Nixon administration worked to enlarge and strengthen 
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), in part to deal with this problem. In 
practice, the ARVN was not up to the challenge. The first major test of this ‘Vietnam-
ization’ policy was an invasion of Laos in February 1971,and it turned into a disaster. 
South Vietnamese forces halted before capturing their objective and then fell back 
in a rout. In Stanley Karnow’s summary, the effort ‘exposed the South Vietnamese 
army’s deficiencies. The government’s top officers had been tutored by Americans 
for ten or fifteen years, many at training schools in the United States, yet they had 
learned little’. More importantly, ‘they represented a regime that rewarded fidelity 
more than competence. [President] Thieu (…) wanted loyalty above all else and his 
military subordinates conformed, realizing that promotions were won in Saigon, not 
in battle’ [Karnow 1997: 644–45]. This is hardly a way to promote the counterin-
surgency aim of winning legitimacy and popular support for the government. Nor 
was the behavior of ordinary ARVN soldiers: according to U.S. field reports, ‘many 
people find it difficult to consider the soldiers as their protectors’, because ‘the army 
steals, rapes, and generally treats the population in a very callous fashion’ [Orme 
1989: 9–30, quoted at p. 30]. 
SOVIET UNION IN AFghANISTAN
The Soviet Union expected a quick win in Afghanistan. Foreign Minister gro-
myko predicted at the time of the invasion that ‘we’ll do everything we need to in 
a month and then get out’ [quoted in Braithwaite 2011: 24]. Indicative of the lead-
ership’s confidence, it did not provide nearly the number of troops for the invasion 
that the military wanted. The political leadership believed that only 35–40,000 troops 
would be needed, but the generals argued for far more. They noted that 500,000 
troops had been used in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and that that had been 
a far easier mission, because of the nature of the country’s terrain, the absence of 
a tradition of opposition to foreign rule, and the absence of an ongoing civil war. 
In the end, roughly 80,000 Soviet troops took part in the invasion. The number did 
increase to 130,000 in 1982, a figure that basically remained constant until 1988, 
although another 40,000 troops periodically staged missions into Afghanistan. Still, 
the Soviets never had enough troops in the country to gain control, much less to in-
itiate offensive missions. Forty percent of Soviet forces were needed to guard fixed 
points and another 35% were needed to protect convoys [Tomsen 2011: 215, 225; 
Braithwaite 2011: 83–84].
Soviet military efforts went through four stages, with different military tactics 
in each stage. Immediately after the invasion, until February 1980, Soviet soldiers 
were only to return fire if attacked or to rescue Soviet personnel captured by the 
enemy. Beginning in February 1980, after continuing military efforts by the armed 
opposition and major protests in Afghan cities, the Soviet military initiated more 
aggressive tactics. The tactics employed were similar to those used during World 
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War II and included major aerial and tank attacks on Afghan cities and a scorched 
earth policy in more remote areas. This second period lasted until the spring of 1985 
when Mikhail gorbachev began to re-think the approach to Afghanistan. Some troops 
were withdrawn at that time, and there was a deliberate effort to reduce casualties. 
Finally, after the November 1986 decision to negotiate a way out of Afghanistan, the 
Soviets adopted tactics aiming to further reduce their casualties [Braithwaite 2011; 
83–84; Tomsen 2011: 213–15].
Concurrent with the decision to leave the country was a new, more political 
approach. Politburo member Yegor Ligachev expressed a sentiment that could have 
applied to each of these cases: ‘We cannot bring them freedom by military means. 
We have already lost by trying to do that’ [quoted in Robinson 2010: 7]. The new 
approach, the ‘Policy of National Reconciliation,’ sought to strengthen the Afghan 
government so that it could survive the departure of Soviet troops. Among its ele-
ments, the much-despised regime of Babrak Karmal was replaced with one headed 
by Muhammad Najibullah. There were efforts to increase the social base of the 
regime, to abandon the leftist direction in economic policy, and to improve living 
conditions in rural areas. As for the fighting, an amnesty was declared as were calls to 
implement local cease-fires. Soviet aid to the country increased after 1986. In 1987, 
it provided more aid to Afghanistan than they had to any single country [Robinson 
2010: 15; Kalinovsky 2011: 100–7]. 
The Soviets also tried to strengthen the Afghan army, an effort that accelerated – 
just as in other cases – once they had made the decision to withdraw. The Soviet-cre-
ated Afghan army looked much better on paper than in reality and it never provided 
much assistance to the Soviet military effort. Many units were below strength. Sol-
diers often left the military after training ended. general Sergei Sokolov, commander 
of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, described Afghan soldiers as ‘illiterate, ill-trained, 
unready for combat, and without military training or discipline’ [quoted in Tomsen 
2011: 215]. There were also doubts about their loyalty: some officers defected to 
the mujahedeen and by the mid-1980s, there were nearly 30,000 desertions a year 
[Braithwaite 2011: 136–38; Tomsen 2011: 223]. 
UNITED STATES IN AFghANISTAN
As in Vietnam, American optimism was reflected in use of few troops at the outset 
of its war in Afghanistan. There were only 10,000 U.S. and 5,000 foreign troops in 
the country in early 2002. The U.S. was able to achieve its victory at such modest 
cost due to the disorganization of the Taliban and reliance on local warlords to do 
most of the fighting. Troop numbers remained low throughout the Bush years. This 
is a good thing in terms of not putting American soldiers at risk, of course, but it 
restricted the ability to build a stronger Afghan regime. For instance, the widely-re-
garded first necessity of post-civil war nation-building is to provide security; to do 
so in Afghanistan, the U.S. relied on local warlords rather than trying to build up 
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government military and police forces. Even as late as 2008, there was no systematic 
effort to build the country’s army or police [Jones 2009: 109–33; Tierney 2010: 231].
There were modest counterinsurgency efforts in the Bush years, e.g., the U.S. 
did engineer the selection of hamid Karzai as President, but its limited troop levels 
and modest economic assistance to Afghanistan ‘translated into one of the lowest 
levels of troops, police, and financial assistance in any stabilization effort since the 
end of World War II’. Economic aid to the country in fiscal year 2003 – which began 
on October 1, 2002, i.e., ten months after the Taliban had been defeated – was ac-
tually $35 billion less than in fiscal year 2002, the Taliban’s last year in power. The 
failures to provide security and enhance the economy help explain the resurgence 
of the Taliban with within five years of their overthrow [Sanger 2010; Jones, 2009: 
109–33, 203–22]. 
The Obama administration came to office committed to do better. There was to 
be much more assistance to the country: in the Bush years (FY 2001–FY 2009), the 
Congress had appropriated $232.7 billion total for Afghanistan, while in the four 
years that followed, a total of $422.3 billion was allocated. The number of troops 
was to increase, from 40,000 to 60,000 in February 2009 and then to 90,000 in De-
cember of that year. Somewhat contradictorily, the President also promised that troop 
withdrawals begin in mid-2011, so by November 2013, there were about 47,000 U.S. 
troops remaining in the country [Livingston and O’hanlon 2013: 4, 15].
Another part of the Obama strategy, not unlike the counterinsurgency strategies 
of the other interveners, was to increase the size and capabilities of the Afghan se-
curity forces. The size of the army increased from 162,000 in March 2009 to nearly 
270,000 by early 2011 to 338,000 by March 2014 [Livingston and O’hanlon 2015: 
6]. It took control in a number of Afghan provinces and has fought well at times, but 
problems remained. The army has limited capabilities; half of the soldiers NATO 
trained cannot read and lacked the skills to complete simple missions [Chandrase-
karan 2012: 141–42; Kassel 2014]. The economic and political aspects of the new 
policy also failed to deliver. It was difficult to recruit American civilians to go to a war 
zone, it could take a year for security agencies to vet them, and once in Afghanistan, 
they were often restricted to bases to insure their security. The new approach further 
heightened Afghan dependence, because as much as 80% of American assistance did 
not flow through the government. Much of the money appropriated for programs in 
Afghanistan did not go to programs in Afghanistan; according to a USAID study, as 
much as 70% of the contracts given to private contractors went to security, overhead, 
and management [Tomsen 2011: 658–61; Chandrasekaran 2012: 190–204].
The U.S. modified its approach yet again in the summer of 2010, committing 
less attention and fewer resources to the country, due to frustration with counterin-
surgency, the planned reductions in the number of U.S. troops, and the decreased 
importance of stability in Afghanistan for America’s anti-terrorism efforts. Also 
relevant was the change in military command from general Stanley McChrystal, 
who had been a strong advocate of counterinsurgency, to general David Petraeus. By 
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September 2010, Petraeus changed McChrystal’s approach from one concentrating 
on the counterinsurgency goal of protecting the population to a more traditional 
military approach that concentrated on capturing and killing terrorists and included 
increased infantry, special forces, and fewer restrictions on the use of firepower 
[Tomsen 2011: 681–82]. 
PERIOD III: DIPLOMACY TO gET OUT
SUMMARY
Eventually, all of these interveners came to recognize that they could not win 
a military or political victory and/or that the costs of doing so were too great. having 
made that decision, however, none of them did what Senator george Aiken proposed 
the U.S. do in Vietnam, i.e., ‘Declare victory and leave’ [quoted in Fein 2012]. Rather, 
all sought a diplomatic exit even as their costs continued to add up. Why did they 
make this decision? To preserve their credibility with friends and foes, to honor 
a commitment they had made to the people of the target country, to secure any gains 
that had been made, and to allow time for measures designed to strengthen the client 
to have an impact. There was also the typical unwillingness of political leaders to 
admit failure and the unwillingness to back away from an enterprise to which they 
had already devoted serious effort and suffered extensive costs [Walt 2010].
There were a number of similarities in the diplomatic phase. First, as suggested 
above, diplomacy only began when the intervener realized that it could not achieve 
its goals militarily or that the costs of doing so were too high. Once negotiations 
began, the intervener often had to negotiate as much with its client as with its foe. 
While the intervener was looking to successful negotiations as a way to get out of 
its dilemma, the client often wanted failed negotiations in order to keep the client 
in. This is one reason why these negotiations were usually lengthy, but there were 
others. The intervener wanted to strengthen the client and enhance the chances of 
its survival, while the opposition, already winning and seeing the departure of the 
intervener’s troops, had less reason to want to negotiate. The outcome of the nego-
tiations generally reflected the situation on the ground: the great power intervener, 
having been unable to realize its interests militarily or politically, was also unable 
to realize them diplomatically. Nonetheless, the interveners might conclude that 
the outcome of the negotiations was something of a success, even if it masked the 
ultimate defeat for their intervention. They were all able to get their troops out of the 
country and the regime they established survived for some period of time. The peo-
ples of Vietnam and Afghanistan and the client regimes supported by the intervener 
would likely have a different evaluation. The wars continued, just without the active 
participation of the intervener, and the client regimes did fall – or in the case of the 
current Afghan government, likely will fall – within several years of the intervener’s 
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departure. France and Vietnam will be the last case examined here, because not all 
of these generalizations apply to it.
U.S. AND VIETNAM
The North Vietnamese/Viet Cong Tet Offensive of January 1968 convinced the 
Americans that winning in Vietnam would be a much more difficult proposition than 
many of them had thought. The war was already imposing significant costs on the 
United States, and by the time it left Vietnam in 1973, the U.S. had spent more than 
$120 billion on the war effort alone, to say nothing of the money spent in Vietnam 
before the arrival of the first American troops. There were also significant costs to 
the American army. It lost more than 58,000 soldiers. Military morale and discipline 
declined over time: there were more than 200 ‘fragging’ incidents in 1970, alone, and 
an official report in 1971 estimated that perhaps one-third of the troops in Vietnam 
were addicted to drugs. The public was also becoming more critical of the war: the 
percentage of non-blacks saying the war in Vietnam was a ‘mistake’ was 40% in 
1964 but had increased to 60% by 1968 and remained at that level for the duration 
of the war. Opposition among blacks was even stronger [Karnow 1997: 646–47; 
Berinsky 2001: 39].
Despite these costs and the stalemated military situation, the Nixon administra-
tion did not simply pick up and leave Vietnam. Why? According to henry Kissinger, 
Nixon’s primary foreign policy adviser, ‘commitment of 500,000 Americans ha[d] 
settled the issue of the importance of Viet Nam. For what is now involved is confi-
dence in American promises. (…) [O]ther nations can gear their actions to ours only 
if they can count on our steadiness. (…) Unilateral withdrawal (…) could therefore 
lead to erosion of restraints and to an even more dangerous international situation’ 
[quoted in Rose 2010: 184, 186]. Therefore, the United States would try to negotiate 
an exit from Vietnam even as it reduced its military presence there. While talks with 
the North Vietnamese had begun soon after Tet, there was little movement until the 
summer of 1972. From 1968–1970, the Americans and North Vietnamese had ad-
vanced incompatible positions, the Americans insisting on mutual troop withdrawal 
from South Vietnam and the North Vietnamese insisting that the Thieu government 
in South Vietnam be removed as part of any peace agreement. The Americans began 
to shift their position in 1970 with an offer of a cease-fire in place, i.e., that North 
Vietnamese combat troops could remain in the South even as the Americans left, 
but the North Vietnamese still insisted on the removal of the Thieu regime. Only in 
the summer of 1972, did they back away from that position, concluding that Thieu 
would not survive the withdrawal of U.S. troops and concentrating on negotiating an 
American withdrawal. With these late concessions, the U.S. and North Vietnamese 
reached a tentative agreement in October 1972 [Karnow 1997: 639–41, 663–69].
Knowing that Thieu would disapprove of its negotiating strategy and conces-
sions, the U.S. deliberately kept the details of the negotiations secret, briefing him 
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in only a general way. When informed about the details of the tentative agreement, 
Thieu reacted angrily. he disapproved of its main provisions, i.e., that the Ameri-
cans would withdraw from South Vietnam while the North Vietnamese would not 
and that he would have to work with communist forces on his country’s future. The 
South Vietnamese president denounced the draft publicly and demanded 69 changes 
that would have had the effect of changing its very nature. Thieu was so angry at 
the draft accord that he later wrote that he wanted to punch Kissinger in the mouth. 
Kissinger, too, was furious, describing Thieu’s proposed changes as ‘preposterous’ 
[Karnow 1997: 664–66, Kissinger quoted at p. 666]. 
Despite their fury at the South Vietnamese leader, the Americans agreed to return 
to the negotiations and present his objections, an effort that went nowhere. At the 
same time, they sought to both pressure and reassure Thieu. Nixon threatened to cut 
off American aid, yet also promised to take action against North Vietnam if it violated 
the agreement. Those rhetorical efforts were reinforced with actions as the United 
States launched a major bombing campaign against North Vietnam in late 1972 and 
increased American aid. The U.S. and North Vietnamese resumed talks in January 
1973 and reached essentially the same agreement as they had the previous October. 
Nixon then sent Thieu an ultimatum, telling him, ‘You must decide now whether you 
desire to continue our alliance or whether you want me to seek a settlement with the 
enemy which serves U.S. interests alone’. Seeing he had no choice, Thieu reluctantly 
agreed [Nguyen 2012: 279–98; Karnow 1997: 665–69, Nixon quoted at p. 669]. 
how to evaluate this agreement? The Americans achieved their primary goals, 
withdrawal of combat troops and the return of American prisoners of war. Despite 
receiving large amounts of American assistance at the time of the agreement, Thieu 
would remain in office for little more than two years; his government was defeated 
in the spring of 1975 and he fled the country. Crucial to Nixon and Kissinger, that 
defeat came several years after the American troop withdrawal and could be attrib-
uted to South Vietnamese incompetence and congressional opposition to continued 
funding rather than the American withdrawal. Thieu’s demise was not an unexpected 
outcome for American decision-makers. Nixon speculated in August 1972, even 
before the conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords, that ‘I look at the tide of history 
out there, South Vietnam is probably never gonna survive anyway’ [quoted in Rose 
2010: 191–92].
SOVIET UNION AND AFghANISTAN
The Soviets had begun to reassess their adventure in Afghanistan as early as 
1981–82, but it was only when Mikhail gorbachev came to power in March 1985 
that they made a serious effort to withdraw. gorbachev believed the Soviet presence 
in Afghanistan was a ‘bleeding wound’ that was harming its international prestige. It 
was also costing too much. By the mid-1980s, the USSR was spending more than $5 
billion annually in Afghanistan, money gorbachev believed could be better spent on 
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domestic reform. The war was also having an adverse impact on the Soviet military: 
according to official figures, nearly 14,000 soldiers were killed and another 50,000 
wounded in Afghanistan, meaning that one of every eight Soviet soldiers who served 
there was either killed or wounded. These costs shaped public opinion. By 1985, only 
about 25% of the urban adult population supported Soviet policies in Afghanistan 
or expressed confidence that the Soviets would succeed there [Maley 1989: 15–17; 
Dibb 2010: 496–98]. The situation on the ground confirmed those opinions. Not 
only were the Soviets paying significant costs, but their efforts were not bearing 
fruit. By 1986–87, Soviet leaders were speaking openly in the Politburo about their 
failures in Afghanistan. The Chief of the general Staff, Sergei Akhromeyev, argued 
that ‘In the past seven years Soviet soldiers have had their boots on the ground in 
every square kilometer of the country. But as soon as they left, the enemy returned 
and restored everything the way it was before. We have lost this war’ [quoted in 
Braithwaite 2011: 278]. Those sentiments did not lead the Soviet leaders to ‘declare 
victory and leave.’ Rather, they sought to end the war diplomatically, even though 
negotiating would take time and impose continuing costs. An important reason they 
chose to do so was to preserve their credibility. gorbachev argued at an April 1986 
Politburo meeting that ‘we must under no circumstances just clear out of Afghanistan 
or we will damage our relations with a large number of foreign friends’ [quoted in 
Kalinovsky 2011: 89].
The geneva talks on Afghanistan involved primarily the governments of Paki-
stan and Afghanistan, with the U.S. and Soviet Union as guarantors. For much of 
the period before the final settlement, the Pakistanis and their American and Saudi 
backers did not want an agreement. Many Americans were more interested in seeing 
the Soviets bleed in Afghanistan than in seeing them leave, especially after 1986 
when President Ronald Reagan signed a directive seeking victory ‘by all means 
possible’. Pakistan also opposed a diplomatic settlement, wanting a military victory 
by the conservative Islamist forces it backed rather any sort of moderate coalition 
government that might emerge from the talks. By 1988, the situation had changed. 
Pakistan’s Muhammad Zia al-haq had agreed to separate the military and political 
issues, allowing Najibullah to remain in power. The Americans became more inter-
ested in Soviet withdrawal, having more confidence in gorbachev and his sincerity 
in wanting to leave [Cordovez and harrison 1995: 253–60; Tomsen 2011: 223–29].
The Soviet-backed Najibullah government remained an obstacle to a diplo-
matic settlement, however. The Afghan leader gave lip service to the idea of the 
geneva negotiations, but in practice he did all he could to undermine the talks. he 
did not broaden his government in a meaningful way to reduce the pressure posed 
by opposition forces and he resisted Soviet efforts to make decisions that might 
have expedited the negotiations. Najibullah never believed that the Soviets would 
withdraw, even after they pushed him to make concessions. To persuade Najibullah 
to go along with the agreement and to soften the impact of their withdrawal, the 
Soviets provided more aid as well as advice about economic and military strategies 
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to survive [Cordovez and harrison 1995: 247–52]. These obstacles were eventually 
overcome and the geneva Accords were concluded on April 14, 1988. gorbachev 
had stated in February 1988, i.e., even before the negotiations had ended, that all 
Soviet troops would be out of Afghanistan within ten months of May 15, 1988. 
Once the agreement was signed, withdrawals began in earnest, with about half of 
the Soviet military forces being withdrawn by July 1988 [Cordovez and harrison 
1995: 266–68; Tomsen 2011: 230–31].
What did the Soviets achieve in the agreement? They were able to withdraw 
their troops but achieved little else. Peter Tomsen compares this geneva agreement 
with another from thirty years previously: ‘Like the 1954 geneva Agreement ending 
France’s failure to reestablish its Indochina Empire, the geneva treaty merely certified 
the military realities on the ground and provided a face-saving cover for great Power 
retreat’ [Tomsen, 2011: 228–29]. A Russian observer, Artemy Kalinovsky, agrees, 
arguing that this was ‘a much weaker document than many in the Soviet government 
and PDPA had sought’, because it did not deal with the question of arms supplies 
for Najibullah’s opponents, did not guarantee a political role for the PDPA, and had 
weak enforcement mechanisms [Kalinovsky 2011: 143]. Still, Najibullah survived 
longer in Kabul than gorbachev did in Moscow, although this is likely due as much 
to infighting among his opponents as to his regime’s strengths. It was only after 
Russia ended aid in 1992 that Najibullah was overthrown.
U.S. AND AFghANISTAN
Americans in Afghanistan, much like the Soviets in the 1980s, came to realize 
that the costs of staying in the country were not worth the continued effort to win 
what was a difficult war. The U.S. had lost more than 2,300 soldiers by September 
2014 and had spent nearly $715 billion in the country between 2001–2014. While 
Obama had endorsed a policy in 2009 that heightened the American commitment to 
the country, he soon came to realize that the cost of that counterinsurgency policy over 
the next decade would be over $1 trillion. Obama concluded that Afghanistan was 
not worth such expenditures in the face of domestic needs and other foreign policy 
challenges [Livingston and O’hanlon 2015; Chandrasekaran 2012: 324]. Reinforcing 
that assessment, the CIA had concluded in October 2010 that the military situation 
was ‘trending to stalemate’ [quoted in Chandrasekaran 2012: 327]. If anything, the 
military situation was worse in 2012 than it had been several years earlier: there were 
twice as many insurgent attacks in 2012 as in 2008. The public, too, was frustrated. 
Asked periodically by ABC News/“Washington Post” whether they believed the war 
in Afghanistan had been worth fighting, the percentage responding ‘no’ increased 
from 41% in February 2007 to 52% in November 2009, to 64% in March 2011, and 
to 66% in December 2013 [Afghanistan; Waldman 2013].
Facing these realities, the Obama administration began to contemplate negotia-
tions, with the Taliban. There were a few contacts in 2011–12, but these were very 
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difficult and halting. In addition to the typical obstacles to negotiations with military 
foes in time of war, there was also the legacy of the failed and frustrating negotiations 
that the Americans had had with the Taliban prior to 9/11. Moreover, any negotiations 
would be incredibly complex. Richard holbrooke, primary negotiator of the 1995 
Dayton Accords ending the Bosnian war and Obama’s point man on Afghanistan, 
argued shortly before his death that, ‘This will be far, far harder than the Balkans,’ 
because ‘[a]t least in the Balkans I knew which thugs to talk to’, while in Afghanistan 
the list of foes or thugs was much longer and had more diverse interests [quoted in 
Sanger 2012: 114–15]. To even begin the talks, the U.S. had to modify what had 
been its three preconditions, i.e., that the Taliban renounce violence, that they sever 
ties with al-Qaeda, and that they become part of the Afghan political process. At the 
beginning of 2012, the only precondition remaining was that they sever ties with 
international terrorists; the other preconditions were now merely desired ‘outcomes’. 
Still later, in early 2013, the U.S. had also dropped the third precondition, that the 
Taliban publicly disavow al-Qaeda [Sanger 2012: 127; Waldman 2013]. The contacts, 
themselves, were all exploratory and aimed at developing mutual confidence. The 
initial discussions centered on prisoner exchanges and the opening of a Taliban office 
in Qatar. The Taliban wanted five of their members released from the guantanamo 
prison in Cuba, while the Americans sought the return of a soldier captured by the 
Taliban. Obama was forced to abandon this proposal in the face of widespread do-
mestic opposition. As a result, and because the American role in Afghanistan was 
coming to an end, American hopes for meaningful talks with the Taliban ended 
[Sanger 2012: 123–28; Rosenberg and Nordland 2013].
The withdrawal of most American troops in the absence of a peace agreement 
heightened the importance of negotiations with the Afghan government about future 
relations between the two countries. Those negotiations were extremely difficult. 
The most important issue was a Bilateral Security Agreement, which would govern 
the number of U.S. troops remaining in the country after 2014, their roles, and their 
immunity from local prosecution for any crimes committed. After a year-long negoti-
ation, President Karzai submitted a draft agreement to a council of elders, a loyajirga, 
in late November 2013. That group approved the agreement, but Karzai then added 
conditions that had to be met before he would sign. These included that President 
Obama apologize for errors by the U.S. military, that 17 prisoners be released from 
guantanamo, and that the remaining U.S. forces not conduct raids in Afghan homes. 
he has also argued that the agreement should be signed by his successor, who would 
only take office in 2014 [Craig and De Young 2013].
To deal with these demands, the United States employed persuasion and threats, 
much as it had in its relations with South Vietnamese President Thieu. While Presi-
dent Obama would not apologize for American military actions, he did send a letter 
to President Karzai in November 2013 that noted that ‘Over time, and especially 
in the recent past, we have redoubled our efforts to ensure that Afghan homes are 
respected by our forces and that our operations are conducted consistent with your 
DAVID JERVIS68
law. We will continue to make every effort to respect the sanctity and dignity of 
Afghans in their homes and in their daily lives, just as we do for our own citizens’. 
The letter also promised that U.S. forces would not enter Afghan homes except under 
‘extraordinary circumstances’ [gerstein 2013]. There were also threats. Karzai was 
told that the agreement had to be signed by the end of 2013 or the U.S. would begin 
preparations for the withdrawal of all its forces and that failure to sign the agreement 
could call into question much of the American aid that had been promised previously 
[Shanker and Ahmed 2013; Craig and De Young 2013]. Neither inducements nor 
threats worked with Karzai, and the BSA was not signed until September 2014, when 
there was a new government in power, one headed by Ashraf ghani. Under the terms 
of the agreement, 9,800 American troops and 3,000 other NATO troops remained 
in the country after the withdrawal of most American and NATO troops in Decem-
ber 2014. They are to engage in training missions for Afghan forces and engage in 
counter-terrorism activities [New Afghan government signs US troop deal 2014].
The conclusion of the BSA and the departure of most American troops enabled 
the United States to realize its immediate objectives. however, achieving its long-
term objective, the creation of a stable Afghanistan that does not serve as a haven 
for terrorists, is uncertain. One observer summarized the problems in October 2014, 
near the end of the American combat role in the country: ‘Insurgent attacks have 
reached the highest levels since 2011, the Afghan army has sustained heavy combat 
losses and is experiencing high attrition rates, and opium poppy cultivation has more 
than doubled from its pre-1999 levels when the Taliban ruled the country, potentially 
undermining the Afghan state’s legitimacy’ [Ratnam 2014].
FRANCE IN VIETNAM
Like the other interveners, France wanted to find a diplomatic route out of its 
Indochina problem. however, the process of the negotiations was different and the 
outcome was better for France than was the outcome for the other interveners. The 
French had recognized as early as 1950 that staying in Vietnam was not worth the 
price. Vietnam was a wasting asset, because its exports were no longer essential to 
the French economy and the value of French exports to Indochina did not pay for 
the costs of a war that, by 1950, accounted for almost 50% of the defense budget. 
At the same time, France wanted to rearm and strengthen its defense position in 
Europe, forcing it to decide between Europe and Asia. It chose Europe, meaning 
a way had to be found to leave Vietnam, or, minimally to reduce expenditures there. 
There were also the human costs. While French conscripts were forbidden from 
serving in Vietnam, volunteers could serve and more than 233,000 did. By 1953, 
more than 100,000 soldiers sent to Vietnam were dead or presumed dead, including 
close to 10,000 French nationals. Such failures had an impact on French opinion; 
supportive at the outset of the war, the public became increasingly skeptical over 
time: by May 1953, 65% of the public wanted either a unilateral withdrawal or 
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a negotiated settlement, while only 19% wanted a more aggressive military posture 
[Cesari 2007: 176–80; Logevall 2012: 349, 354, 607]. 
Negotiations finally began in May 1954, and they were concluded little more 
than ten weeks later, on July 20, 1954. Such rapid progress distinguishes this case 
from the others considered here. That progress was due to the intervener’s desire 
for a rapid rather than a gradual withdrawal, especially after Pierre Mendès-France 
came to power in Paris in mid-June. Mendès-France had long criticized the French 
role in Indochina and promised to resign in thirty days if he did not conclude an 
agreement in geneva. Yet another difference in this case was that the negotiations 
were multilateral, with all of the great powers present in addition to the parties in 
the war, itself, and most of those parties also wanted a settlement. Mendès-France’s 
deadline put pressure on everyone, and the parties directly involved in the conflict 
agreed to a deal that included a French-Viet Minh cease-fire; French withdrawal 
from Cambodia and Laos; and a temporary partition of Vietnam that would end in 
two years after elections to unify the country. 
The negotiations between these foes were certainly more involved than de-
scribed here, but the primary obstacles for the French were their friends, the Bao 
Dai government in Vietnam and the Americans. When parties to the conference 
began to consider the partition of Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, the prime minister in 
Bao Dai’s government, was adamant in his opposition and urged the French not to 
agree. Perhaps that is one reason why the French, not unlike the Americans would 
do later, consulted little with their Vietnamese allies in the final days of the negoti-
ations. The final agreement was denounced by Diem, who asserted that ‘We cannot 
recognize the seizure by Soviet China [sic] (…) of over half of our national territory. 
We can neither concur in the brutal enslavement of millions of compatriots’ [quoted 
in Jacobs 2006: 42]. France’s American allies also did not want a settlement. They 
were, by 1954, more supportive of the French military effort in Indochina than the 
French were, providing most of the funds and trying to arrange for some sort of 
western ‘united action’ to help the French prevail. Why did the Americans oppose 
a negotiated settlement? Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told Mendès-France 
that ‘What you sign in geneva will be bad. We do not want (…) to encourage a new 
Yalta’ [quoted in Logevall 2012: 600]. given their opposition to any agreement with 
communists, it is not surprising that the United States did not sign the geneva Ac-
cords; it merely ‘took note’ of them and promised to ‘refrain from the threat or use of 
force to disturb them’ in the words of the American representative at the conference 
[quoted in Logevall 2012: 606].
In yet another difference with other interveners, the French achieved a very good 
deal in geneva. Mendès-France ‘had won more for France at the conference table 
than its generals had won on the battlefield’ [Karnow 1997: 220]. Soon after ge-
neva, however, the Americans replaced the French and their client, Diem, arranged 
for the removal of Bao Dai, who had been appointed by the French. Over the longer 
term, ‘(…) the geneva Conference produced no durable solution to the Indochina 
DAVID JERVIS70
conflict, only a military truce that awaited a political settlement, which never really 
happened’ [Karnow 1997: 215]. That is, in this case as in the others, the conflict 
between the Vietnamese parties continued after the great power intervener had left.
CONCLUSIONS
The obvious conclusions of this study are that these interveners followed broadly 
similar policies in a similar sequence and that none were able to realize their goals. 
This article has identified the pattern. French, Soviet, and American interveners 
first tried to reach their goals using a variety of political techniques. The predictable 
failure of political means, for a variety of reasons, was followed by an initial appli-
cation of military force. That, too, failed, so the interveners expanded their military 
involvement and altered their tactics, sometimes repeatedly. Military efforts, too, 
failed and the interveners eventually sought a diplomatic exit from their dilemma. 
This diplomatic period was usually a lengthy one, because the parties to the conflicts 
often had reasons to extend it, but a settlement was eventually reached and the in-
terveners left without realizing their goals but with some degree of dignity. To these 
three periods, one might add a fourth, i.e., French, Soviet, and American policies 
after the conclusion of the diplomatic period. In three of these cases, the intervener 
continued to provide diplomatic, military, and economic support to its client (less true 
in the case of France and Vietnam, because the Americans soon replaced the French 
and provided their own economic and military support), yet their client regime would 
lose power within two or three years, or, in the case of contemporary Afghanistan, 
might well lose power in two or three years [Yousafzai 2015]. 
The identification of this pattern of intervention suggests a number of topics for 
future research. Why did the general pattern and similar behaviors in the political, 
military, and diplomatic periods exist? Can a similar pattern be identified in other 
cases of Western intervention in non-Western countries? As for policy implications, 
one might investigate whether chances of success would have been greater if a dif-
ferent pattern had been followed. For instance, if the failure of initial political efforts 
was predictable, why not simply resort to military actions from the outset? Would 
military success have been more likely if the country providing sanctuary for the 
Vietnamese and Afghan insurgents had been invaded? A question for Americans is 
why they intervened in the first place. Their intervention in Vietnam immediately 
followed that of the French, who had lost despite significant American assistance, and 
intervention in Afghanistan occurred barely a decade after the Soviet departure, some-
thing the U.S. had contributed to greatly. Why did the U.S. presume that it could do 
better than either of those other great power interveners had just a few years before?
The author plans to consider some of these questions in future research. More-
over, recent events, e.g., American intervention in Iraq after 2003, British, French, 
and American intervention in Libya in 2011, and Russian and American intervention 
PATTERNS OF gREAT POWER INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM AND AFghANISTAN 71
in Syria in 2015, create a number of opportunities to apply this study’s conclusions 
to other cases. 
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